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One of our problems these days, I think, is that the word "war" is getting used too much.
The "Cold War" wasn't really a war. Treating it as one for 50 years did great harm to the
American system of government, making the President too powerful and the Congress too weak.
We had the "war on poverty" under Lyndon Johnson, and the "war on drugs," and now the "war
on terrorism," none of which are really wars. By calling his response to Sept.11, 2001 a "war,"
rather than stepped-up police work, Bush has made himself the Commander-in-Chief, and
anyone who opposes him a traitor, for as long as terrorism is a threat. Likewise, saying that
arguments are like war, or that war is a useful metaphor for thinking about arguments, as Lakoff
and Johnson did in Metaphors We Live By in 1980, is profoundly misleading, I think. (By the
way, they said only that it was one way we seem to think about arguments, not the only way or
the best way.) So I'm basically unsympathetic to the idea that arguments are like war, unless it's
shown to me that they really are.
Also, I think that the "just-war theory," as updated by Michael Walzer in his Just and
Unjust Wars, is completely inadequate for understanding modern wars, because it assumes that
all wars are between nations, thus not covering revolutions, civil wars, and terrorism; and that all
existing nations are equally legitimate and entitled to go on existing, by questionable analogy
with the right of individuals to self-defense. So I started with a bias against both sides of Mr.
Cohen's idea.
Nevertheless, I found his article interesting, and I agreed with a lot of what he said! For
our purpose here, we can ignore the problems with the just-war theory, and concentrate on the
idea that arguments are like war. Cohen gives an even longer list than Lakoff and Johnson of
expressions in English that can apply both to arguments and war: attack, victory, strategy, retreat,
etc. My first problem is that all of these expressions also apply to duels, and to combative sports
like boxing and wrestling, and to games like chess and go. Aren't these individual and usually
non-lethal activities much more like arguing than war is? War is large groups of people trying to
destroy each other, using any available means (although just-war theory tries to put some limits
on the motives and the means, sometimes with partial success). Hegel did think of wars as
arguments between the collective souls of peoples, leaving mankind a little wiser each time; but I
think that idea went out with World War I. Meanwhile, argument is sometimes a rather stylized
form of combat with words, following certain rules, as in a law court. Instead of saying that
argument in general is like war in general, then, we should say that argument is sometimes like
dueling, or wrestling, or chess.
But it can be like non-competitive things too, as Cohen pointed out in an earlier article,
like building a bridge or a barn. Or it can be like golf, where your "opponent" can be your own
previous effort. Cohen goes on in this article to point out that wars, but not arguments, involve
prisoners, and armies; while arguments, but not wars, involve premises and conclusions. So
they're quite different too. In fact, when he tries to apply just-war theory to arguments, he soon
admits that "Argumentation per se is not a bad thing. War per se is. Argumentation is not
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something to be avoided. War is. Arguments... are good things. They clarify our positions,
strengthen our convictions, lead us to new beliefs, and, for some of us, even provide a measure
of enjoyment. What's to justify?" (p.3) This is a crucial admission, because without the
presumption that war is bad there is no point to just-war theory--it is an attempt to contain war
within acceptable limits-- and there is no corresponding presumption against arguments, only to
some ways of arguing: unfairly, inappropriately, too emotionally, etc. It seems farfetched to me,
then, to compare "collateral damage" in war with children being upset by overhearing their
parents arguing. They can also be upset by overhearing their parents making love; does that
make lovemaking like war? Comparing intervening in various ways in an ongoing argument
between two people to a nation entering an ongoing war, as in his 6 cases, also seems to me
farfetched, given that there is no general reason not to join in an argument.
Cohen understands very well the limits of the "argument is war" metaphor. Indeed, the
point of his paper seems to be to bring out those limits by showing that an application of just-war
theory to arguments is not very enlightening! (Am I right about this?)
But there is a closely related metaphor that is interesting, I think, and that I want to
explore briefly in my remaining time. The term "argument" is ambiguous. It can refer to a
concrete situation in which two or more people are trying to persuade each other (or impress
each other, or impress a third person, etc.). This is what rhetoric takes as arguments, and it seems
to be what Cohen (and Lakoff and Johnson) are primarily thinking of. Ever since Aristotle, this
sort of argument has been analyzed by considering the "speaker" and the "audience" as well as
the "speech." President Bush gave speeches to many different audiences about why we should
make war on Iraq, and these can be analyzed to see what devices he used, how effective they
were, etc.
Ever since Plato's dialogues, however, philosophers (and scientists) have had a different
meaning of "argument," in which we abstract from the speaker and the audience on a particular
occasion, and even from the manner of expression, and ask "What was the argument for going to
war with Iraq? That is, what was the reason (or reasons) for doing it? What was the argument
against? And which is stronger?" In Logic courses, we teach students to make this abstraction
from the specific arguments made by particular people and to evaluate the abstract form for
validity. In the same way, we ask "What is the argument for the existence of a God?" or "What is
the argument for black holes?" And these abstract arguments have a certain amount of force to
them, ranging from leaving an issue wide open to compelling a conclusion. This "force of argument" is a metaphor too, but this one describes something essential about arguments, the
element of necessity in them. I realize that asking exactly what an argument (in this sense) is,
what sort of reality it has, could take us deep into the heart of epistemology, into notorious
controversies about the mind and reality. But up to a point, at least, it seems uncontroversial to
me that arguments can be evaluated for their normative "force" apart from how persuasive they
are to particular people. In this philosophical sense, arguments have no similarity to war.
The first person to understand this difference between rhetoric and philosophy was Plato.
So I too will close by referring to Socrates. Toward the end of Plato's great dialogue Gorgias, in
which Socrates and Callicles are arguing about which is the more valuable art, rhetoric or
philosophy, Callicles feels he is "losing" and quits in disgust, threatening Socrates with a fatal
lawsuit (a perfect example of "argument as war"!). Socrates' response is to continue the argument
by himself, taking both sides in turn abstracting their essence and evaluating them, for about 10
pages. Now there is no human "winner" or "loser," only a testing of both positions for "force," to
find out where truth lies. This is argument as the search for knowledge, or rational belief. It has
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essentially nothing to do with winning or losing, or with war. So argument can be competitive,
like dueling or wrestling, but it doesn't need to be. It can be more like building a bridge, testing
its foundation and structure for reliability as we go. Mr. Cohen knows this, but he goes on talking
as if he didn't.
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